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The Internet Ecosystem - The Potential for Discrimination 
 
Abstract	  
 
The Federal Communication Commission is considering rules enforcing “network 
neutrality” and legislation proposing similar goals have been discussed in Congress. The 
goals of the proposed regulation and legislation are preserve an “open Internet”, but are 
specifically directed toward access networks, or the first link that directly connects users 
to the Internet. We argue that preserving open competition in a host of “higher level” 
Internet services is equally if not more important, but since the rate of technology 
innovation typically out-paces the need for regulation, there is no need to impose 
regulation at this time. Using specific examples focused on the “visible Internet” as well 
as new services and applications that enable rapid innovation, we argue that the Internet 
has fostered a history of technological and business solutions that overcome what seems 
to be certain market dominance. A key enabler of these changes is the emergence of 
technologies that lower the barrier for entry in developing and deploying new services. 
We argue that regulators should be aware of the potential for anti-competitive practices, 
but should carefully consider the effects of regulation on the full Internet ecosystem. We 
believe that consumers will be better served through education, maintaining competitive 
environments and technical forecasting. 
 
 The	  Premise	  Behind	  Network	  Neutrality	  
The premise behind the current debate in network neutrality was articulated in an FCC 
policy statement adopted in August, 20051 that stated four goals for the Internet: 
1. Consumers are entitled to access the lawful content of their choice. 
2. Consumers are entitled to run applications and use services of their choice, 
subject to the needs of law enforcement. 
3. Consumers are entitled to connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm 
the network. 
4. Consumers are entitled to competition between network providers, application 
and service providers, and content providers. 
Proposed rules would extend these four core principles with two additional rules: 
5. A provider of broadband Internet access service must treat lawful content, 
applications, and services in a nondiscriminatory manner  
 
6. A provider of broadband Internet access service must disclose such information 
concerning network management and other practices as is reasonably required for 
users and content, application, and service providers to enjoy the protections 
specified in this rulemaking 
Broadly speaking, participants in the network neutrality debate use the same term to 
conflate two issues – accessing content of their choice and, more narrowly, enabling the 
development of a competitive environment for services, applications and content 
providers by maintaining “neutral” access to the last link for consumers or the “public” 
Internet (the “access network”). 
The two primary concerns have been that access network providers would provide 
preferential treatment to specific uses of the network and may go so far as to block 
certain kinds of applications. To support this concern, proponents of regulation point to a 
small number of documented cases where ISPs have blocked specific services (VOIP and 
file sharing). There is concern about a lack of transparency in network management and 
how that might lessen the current Internet or unfairly limit competition. But the ability to 
limit access to Internet applications is not restricted to access networks. Such restrictions 
can be enacted by many components used to access Internet content, such as the browser 
and services or applications within the Internet.  
Likewise, there are many ways to enact preferential access. In (Grunwald 2007), we 
discussed aspects of current Internet access network designs that can lead to higher 
                                                1	   	  FCC	  Policy	  Statement	  FCC	  05-­‐151,	  issued	  August	  5,	  2005,	  released	  September	  23,	  2005.	  
barriers for innovation and new services or can allow subtle forms of preferential network 
access. We specifically focused on asymmetric access links and content distribution 
networks (CDNs). Asymmetric access networks2 make it more difficult for consumers to 
“self-publish” and commercial content distribution networks3 can effectively provide 
“preferential access” to content provisioned on a CDN located within an ISP’s network 
without actually violating “neutral” access network policies.  
We argued that these barriers impose as much risk as preferential treatment of access 
networks but that network neutrality regulation focused solely on access networks would 
be unlikely to address these barriers. Instead, the proposed regulations may hamper 
network innovation at the access network as well as the core of the network while still 
leaving open the door for anti-competitive actions that the regulations are intended to 
forestall.  
In this paper, we explore other parts of the Internet ecosystem and how they affect open 
and competitive networks. There is broad consensus that layers of the Internet ecosystem 
other than the access network may impact competition and innovation; the question 
remains if new rules are needed. In the conclusion of a paper describing the economic 
history of price discrimination in telecommunications networks, (Odlyzko 2009) wrote: 
“For telecommunications, given current trends in demand and in rate and 
sources of innovation, it appears to be better for society not to tilt towards 
the operators, and instead to stimulate innovation on the network by others 
by enforcing net neutrality. But this would likely open the way for other 
players, such as Google, that emerge from that open and competitive arena 
as big winners, to become choke points. So it would be wise to prepare to 
monitor what happens, and be ready to intervene by imposing neutrality 
rules on them when necessary.” 
Odlyzko’s point was that what he termed “cloud computing”4 would become a more 
important marketplace for innovation than services integrated into access networks; his 
implication mirrors ours -- focusing on those access networks may distract from anti-
competitive behavior in those other markets. 
In this paper, we agree with Odlyzko’s observation that other parts of the Internet 
ecosystem are equally powerful in determining the rich competitive environment of the 
Internet and show for past, current and emerging parts of the Internet. At the same time, 
we argue that regulation and action, either that proposed for the access network or 
                                                2	  Most	  broadband	  access	  networks	  have	  higher	  download	  speeds	  than	  upload	  speeds;	  e.g.	  DOCSIS	  cable	  models	  typically	  support	  ~8mb/s	  downloads	  but	  0.4Mb/s	  uploads	  and	  variants	  of	  xDSL	  technology	  have	  similar	  asymmetries.	  These	  communication	  asymmetries	  make	  it	  difficult	  for	  consumers	  to	  host	  services	  in	  their	  home	  or	  to	  generate	  content.	  
3	  Examples	  of	  “Content	  Distribution	  Network”	  (or	  CDNs)	  include	  Akami,	  Limelight	  and	  Amazon	  Cloudcast.	  These	  services	  make	  multiple	  copies	  of	  content	  available	  at	  multiple	  physical	  locations	  in	  the	  Internet,	  improving	  the	  experience	  of	  accessing	  that	  content	  under	  periods	  of	  high	  demand.	  
4	  By	  this	  term,	  Odlyzko	  meant	  software	  services	  hosted	  on	  computers	  not	  located	  at	  a	  persons	  home	  or	  business;	  later	  we’ll	  see	  that	  current	  common	  usage	  has	  two	  meanings	  for	  this	  term	  and	  disambiguate	  those	  meanings.	  
extending beyond those networks (through ambiguity or design), should only be applied 
when clear harms are shown. The development of specific technologies, coupled with the 
pace of technology development, the continued innovation of the Internet community and 
use of existing laws has served the Internet well.  
The FCC Notice for Proposed Rule Making released in October 2009 attempts to insure a 
competitive market place, but it does so through regulating one subset pf providers and 
certain, specific network characteristics such as traffic priorities5 and managed services 
(having multiple services use a single physical transport). This focus ignores the fact that 
the Internet evolves over time and is far from a finished work. In fact, the National 
Science Foundation, the national agency that has long funded Internet research, has 
launched multiple research programs to define the future Internet6. Extending the existing 
Internet is difficult, because it has become essential to society, but there are clear reasons 
to improve on the current design. Would regulation add yet more friction to process of 
improving the Internet? Are we doomed to the Internet of today? 
Rather than use words like “discrimination”, network engineers prefer terms like 
“network management” and “prioritization”. One form of prioritization endemic to the 
Internet is “congestion control”; congestion occurs in a network when too many packets 
try to use the same resource (link or router). The Internet Protocol handles congestion by 
simply discarding packets when resources are limited. But congestion requires that the 
transmitter slow down, or the network can enter a “congestion collapse” whereby no 
useful communication takes place7. The original Internet design principles emphasized 
“end-to-end” control (Saltzer 84) and assumed that the computers at each end of a 
transmission would cooperate to prevent congestion collapse. In 1986, the network 
experienced a series of congestion collapses that reduced useful throughput by factors of 
10-1000. New congestion control methods were introduced then, and have continued to 
be developed. Different congestion control methods, implemented on devices or working 
in concert with network routers, affect how competing network flows use the networks to 
                                                5	  The	  use	  of	  the	  word	  “discrimination”	  in	  the	  proposed	  rules	  is	  regrettable.	  From	  a	  technical	  perspective,	  discrimination	  can	  mean	  any	  form	  of	  differentiation,	  including	  simple	  traffic	  prioritization	  designed	  to	  improve	  performance;	  however,	  the	  word	  is	  laden	  with	  other	  meanings	  by	  events	  and	  history	  external	  to	  network	  engineering.	  
6	  The	  “Future	  Internet	  Directions”	  program	  (FIND)	  has	  funded	  research	  to	  address	  how	  parts	  of	  the	  Internet	  design	  need	  to	  change	  in	  response	  to	  new	  demands	  and	  technologies.	  The	  NSF	  GENI	  program	  (Global	  Environments	  for	  Network	  Innovation)	  program	  is	  funding	  the	  development	  of	  test	  platforms	  and	  new	  technologies	  for	  future	  Internets.	  Similar	  efforts	  are	  underway	  in	  Europe,	  Japan	  and	  other	  countries	  as	  well.	  
7	  For	  example,	  assume	  two	  transmitters	  are	  trying	  to	  use	  a	  single	  common	  link	  that	  has	  a	  capacity	  of	  100	  packets/second.	  Both	  transmitters	  want	  all	  of	  their	  data	  to	  be	  received	  and	  will	  re-­‐transmit	  packets	  if	  they	  are	  discarded.	  If	  one	  transmitter	  injects	  100	  packets	  per	  second	  on	  to	  that	  link	  while	  the	  other	  injects	  10,	  some	  packets	  will	  have	  to	  be	  discarded.	  Assuming	  a	  random	  discard	  policy,	  91%	  of	  the	  discarded	  packets	  will	  be	  from	  the	  higher	  rate	  transmitter.	  If	  the	  transmitter	  determines	  that	  those	  packets	  were	  dropped,	  it	  would	  retransmit	  those	  packets	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  existing	  100	  packets/second,	  resulting	  in	  increased	  congestion.	  As	  more	  and	  more	  packets	  from	  the	  faster	  transmitter	  are	  dropped,	  it	  will	  increase	  sending	  rate	  until	  its	  access	  link	  capacity	  is	  reached.	  This	  “congestion	  collapse”	  insures	  that	  and	  increasing	  number	  of	  packets	  are	  discarded	  and	  also	  negatively	  affects	  the	  slower	  transmitter,	  because	  its	  packets	  will	  make	  up	  an	  increasingly	  dwindling	  portion	  of	  the	  packets	  that	  traverse	  the	  congested	  link.	  
improve the overall efficiency of a complex, distributed and decentralized system. Would 
this research and innovation be possible with the proposed FCC rules in place? 
Although the Internet is 40 years old, the commercial Internet is only 15-20 years old. 
New applications and an increased number of users changes assumptions network 
engineers have made and exposes the network to new challenges with the concomitant 
need for new solutions. In an effort to maintain a rich Internet environment, the proposed 
regulations focus on access networks without considering how anti-competitive pressures 
can be applied in the remainder of the Internet. It also regulates a mechanism (traffic 
prioritization) that is used in congestion control, but at the same time is part of the basic 
Internet design. Likewise, although the FCC NPRM addresses the distinction between the 
“managed” and “public” Internet, it does so in a limited way that may hamper innovation 
in “managed” networks or in the Interface between private and public networks.  
We argue that there are better ways to maintain a vibrant Internet. These include: having 
clear standards and methods for measuring what is actually happening in the Internet as 
well as methods for reporting or disseminating policy to consumers; use existing agencies 
and policies; encourage innovation and competition for access networks; and, develop 
“best practices” that can be clearly understood by network operators, regulators and 
consumers. 
Risks	  To	  The	  Internet	  Ecosystem	  
The Internet is composed of many parts that make up the “experience” that end users now 
confront. Just as the phone network is made more useful by 411, white pages, yellow 
pages, 911 and other services or applications, the Internet is made more useful by domain 
names, browsers, search engines and services that are integral to the web. Insuring 
competition and a rich Internet environment by solely focusing on the local loop, as is 
being done with the Internet, clearly misses the mark – the entire “ecosystem” that 
influences either network experience is important. 
To understand how applications and services can foster an anti-competitive environment, 
we examine a series of past concerns about Internet exclusion and market dominance, 
starting with the platforms that enabled web access and stretching to services that now 
generate the most debate. These examples illustrate the rapid pace of innovation and 
demonstrate that the Internet often innovates its way out of anti-competitive markets; it 
also shows that even when that doesn’t happen, existing laws and regulations enforced by 
the FTC and the Justice Department can level the playing field.  
Access To The Web – The Browser 
The web browser is an application that has had almost total market dominance by 
multiple companies at different times. One of the earliest graphical Internet web browsers 
was Mosaic, developed by students and staff at the University of Illinois. The Mosaic 
developers founded Netscape to commercialize the browser. Although other companies, 
particularly Microsoft, developed other browsers in the mid ‘90’s, Netscape maintained 
~80-90% share of the browser market until Microsoft bundled its own product, Internet 
Explorer, with Windows 98. Netscape’s fortunes quickly soured as Internet Explorer 
reached a 90% share of the browser market; Internet Explorer now has 63% market share, 
having lost share to browsers developed in the last 5 years8. 
It’s rare for a market to switch from total domination by one product to another so 
quickly. However, as Netscape discovered, the problem with marketing a browser was 
how to monetize the product. Most businesses were hoping to use the browser to steer 
users to specific web properties. Open standards allow rapid substitution of one product 
for another and but can equally favor the adoption of software that “extends” those 
standards. Internet Explorer enabled Microsoft to launch protocols that favored other 
Microsoft products (either Windows desktops or Windows Server). Chief among these 
were “ActiveX controls”, a mechanism to embed software unique to Windows in web 
page. Many of these “controls” provided mechanisms missing in the Web (such as audio 
or video); because ActiveX only worked with Microsoft clients, the use of such controls 
drove many to rely on Microsoft software. The combined control of the most common 
operating system and the pre-installed browser brought on anti-trust actions and an initial 
finding of monopoly power. 
Although Internet Explorer still dominates the browser market, alternate services, new 
technologies and standards eliminated much of the threat of Internet Explorer.  AOL 
eventually purchased Netscape and much of the code-base was spun off into the popular 
open-source “Mozilla” and later “Firefox” browser platform. Additional vendors, 
primarily Apple, Opera and now Google, produced other competitive browsers. Increased 
broadband speeds and better software installation and update processes made it easier to 
install competing browsers. At the same time, browsers became ubiquitous, becoming a 
universal way to access and control devices ranging from printers to alarm clocks; 
manufacturers wanted those controls to be universal. A wide-spread “open standards” 
effort ensued to identify browser techniques that limited users to Windows based 
computers; lobbying and branding by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) led 
governments and many companies to eschew IE-specific mechanisms to focus on a 
“works with any browser” standard. At the same time, the development of “Web 2.0” 
technologies such as AJAX around 20049, coupled with increased broadband speeds, 
meant that many of the Microsoft-specific “ActiveX controls” could be replaced by 
software that worked across all browsers. The impetus for a standards based browser has 
become particularly important as web browsers have become an integral part of mobile 
phones that are unable to use Windows-specific features, such as the iPhone. 
Although Internet Explorer still dominates the browser market, that dominance connotes 
little economic advantage to Microsoft at this point; the majority of Microsoft profits still 
arise from sales of Windows and Office rather than on-line products. However, without 
the development of alternative software and open standards by organizations such as 
                                                8	  Browser	  adoption	  rates	  are	  highly	  regional.	  Gregg	  Keizer	  “See	  Google's	  Chrome	  grabs	  No.	  3	  browser	  spot	  from	  Safari”,	  Computerworld	  Jan	  2	  2010,	  http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9142958/Google_s_Chrome_grabs_No._3_browser_spot_from_Safari	  
9	  AJAX	  is	  a	  term	  used	  to	  describe	  one	  way	  in	  which	  “rich”	  web	  applications	  are	  developed	  using	  nothing	  more	  than	  standard	  web	  browser	  protocols.	  Gmail,	  released	  by	  Google	  in	  2004,	  was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  widely	  known	  AJAX	  applications.	  Jesse	  James	  Garrett	  (who	  coined	  the	  term	  AJAX)	  has	  a	  readable	  description	  of	  the	  technology	  at	  	  http://www.adaptivepath.com/ideas/essays/archives/000385.php.	  
W3C, the present situation might not have come about and could rapidly change. It’s 
arguable that the anti-trust investigation of Microsoft was what led to the current 
situation. It’s equally plausible that the development of mobile phones, and the demands 
of that emerging non-Windows ecosystem, or the deployment of broadband and more 
interactive web pages using AJAX forestalled the dependency on Microsoft-specific 
features. One thing is certain; competition, innovation and existing legal recourse opened 
access to the Internet without the next for additional regulation. 
Rich Internet applications, Video and the New Content Companies  
Less well known than the “browser wars” is the (on-going) battle for “rich Internet 
applications”10. RIA is now a fundamental part of the Internet ecosystem. These 
environments provide extended usability to systems like Google Mail, NetFlix, Hulu, 
Microsoft Live, Yahoo News and many other websites – RIA allows conventional 
“desktop” applications to be replaced by web-based applications. The features that made 
Internet Explorer indispensible in many areas were for “rich web applications”; RIA 
environments make that approach work across different operating systems. Microsoft 
sought to use the Windows infrastructure to allow developers to use existing Windows 
code in Web applications. The primary alternative approach was Java, developed by Sun 
Microsystems by which programmers could develop “applets,” or programs that ran 
within a web browser. Although the Java language found extensive use in business 
software, applets experienced limited success, largely because the process of installing 
software was relatively complex.  Macromedia Flash was introduced in 1996 and rapidly 
became the primary RIA tool; it’s currently installed in more than 90% of browsers and is 
used to power many video and on-line game sites. Later entrants were Microsoft 
Silverlight (similar to Flash and Java) and Adobe AIR (developed as an extension to 
Flash when Adobe acquired Macromedia). 
Surprisingly there has been little concern to date that any of these alternatives would 
preclude effective competition. In large part, this is because there are “open source” 
implementations of the dominant platform (Flash) and any one system is largely 
substitutable for the other (although not always on the same device). More importantly, 
existing and new standards based technologies are replacing many of the functions for 
which developers turn to RIA frameworks. This point was argued by Microsoft in a 
200711 response to a motion by the State of California that Microsoft’s development of 
Silverlight should extend the earlier anti-trust actions12 . Some Microsoft web services 
(such as Bing! 3-D maps) still require SilverLight and Active-X controls. Others13 argue 
that the required use of Silverlight for specific high-profile events (Olympic events, 
                                                10	  	  See	  Jim	  Rapoza,	  “RIA	  War	  Is	  Brewing”,	  Eweek	  Emerging	  Technologies,	  available	  at	  http://etech.eweek.com/content/application_development/ria_war_is_brewing.html	  
11	  See	  Charles	  Rule,	  Bradford	  Smith,	  Steven	  Holley,	  “Microsoft’s	  Report	  Concerning	  The	  Final	  Judgments”,	  filed	  in	  Civil	  Action	  No.	  98-­‐1233	  (CKK),	  August	  31,	  2007	  
12	  	  An	  analysis	  of	  the	  filing	  is	  available	  by	  Todd	  Bishop,	  “Antitrust	  Filing	  Cites	  Microsoft	  Silverlight	  Concern”,	  Seattle	  Post	  Intelligencer	  Blog,	  Oct.	  17th,	  2007,	  http://blog.seattlepi.com/microsoft/archives/123837.asp	  
13	  See	  John	  Markoff,	  “Microsoft	  leveraging	  Silverlight	  and	  riling	  critics”,	  August	  11,	  2008,	  http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/11/technology/11iht-­‐stream11.1.15135139.html?_r=1	  
Presidential Inauguration) and bundling of Silverlight with Windows 7 will raise the 
same anti-competitive issues that Netscape faced in the ‘90s.  
The argument that “open” alternatives suffice is compelling; most of the applications by 
Google rely on JavaScript, a programming language that has long been a standard tool 
embedded in web browsers14. Rather than develop a new programming environment, 
Google, Apple and Firefox have worked to greatly increase the usefulness of JavaScript, 
making that standard tool more suitable for many “rich” applications.  The web standards 
community also developed HTML5, the latest combination of the lingua franca of web 
browsers. That standard supplants many of the reasons RIA frameworks were needed, 
such as high performance video playback, access to geographic location as well as 
support for storing and accessing data via the browser. These individual components 
allow large changes to applications – for example, using HTML5, Google Gmail can 
function more like a standard email client allowing access to email even when not 
connected to the Internet. 
This analysis of RIA environments serves to show how regulation decisions are 
interconnected by past technology. Had Microsoft “won” the browser wars, most of this 
innovation wouldn’t have occurred – developers would have used Microsoft components 
rather than adopt a new RIA framework. This would have also altered the landscape of 
devices, such as the iPhone, that are used to access the Web. The competitive alternatives 
are so diverse and rich that government intervention isn’t needed; but the past experience 
of the “browser war” shows that existing methods for intervention are possible and 
effective when needed. 
Naming and Information Discovery 
Names play a central role in the Internet. People need to be able to access websites and 
services. The Domain Name System (DNS), which translates names to IP addresses, is 
central to naming in the Internet. With the rise of the commercial Internet and the Internet 
Corporation for Names and Numbers (ICANN), ownership of domain names clearly 
related to existing trademarks and properties was disputed and a uniform resolution 
method was enforced. Naming is one of the clearest cases of regulation applied to 
Internet services, and a number of national and international laws, rules and bodies have 
been created to address names, particularly as applied to commercial interests. 
Today, search has taken on the importance originally attributed to DNS names. No part of 
the Internet Ecosystem would appear to be as important as search and search is a now 
universal way for finding new information, even supplanting the common use of domain 
names – many of the most common search terms on Google are the names of (often 
competing) web services, indicating that users rely on search for even trivial or well 
known information.  
Should search be regulated? Recently, there have calls for such regulation (Pasquale 
2008), often based on the dominance of a single search engine. While this argument is 
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  It	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similar to that of DNS, there is a distinct difference – DNS was a single system essential 
to the core operation of the Internet, while e.g. Google is one of many search services. 
More over, search services were not originally intended to identify commercial interests – 
they were intended to “discover information”. 
Although Google dominates current search services, there have been numerous popular 
search services over time – AltaVista, Goto, Ask, Yahoo and different Microsoft systems.  
The current dominance of Google (currently estimated at ~65-85% US market share15), 
coupled with the consolidation of on-line advertising, has led some to call for regulation 
of search engines and search-based advertising to make it “neutral”. The key objection is 
that search (and Google specifically) is so influential on the way people find information 
that it constitutes a “gatekeeper” on the Internet. In one New York Times Op-Ed article16, 
Adam Raff, founder of a company promoting an alternative search engine, describes how 
Google has promoted its own products (maps, shopping services, etc) over that of other 
companies in search results. It’s difficult to know why a specific Internet tool (e.g. 
MapQuest vs. Google Maps) falls from favor. Clearly, advertising a service is one reason, 
but so are features and usability.  It’s difficult to simultaneously argue that customers are 
unlikely to flock to a new search engine but would rapidly switch to new mapping 
software simply because it is well advertised. Advertising drives the substantial growth of 
Google; existing anti-trust measures would seem to govern and appear to have been 
successfully applied in specific instances, such as to counter the proposed joint Yahoo!-
Google advertising pact17 and exclusive licensing of digital books. 
Many of the arguments for regulating search are based on the difficulty of effective 
competition (Pasquale 2008). Search is composed of three main components – crawling, 
indexing and presentation. Crawling is the traversal of web pages – bringing the content 
of those pages to be indexed. Indexing records the information in the pages so that 
specific web pages can be quickly identified. Retrieval and presentation transform search 
requests into queries that search the indices and present the results to the users. Pasquale 
and Bracha (Pasquale 2008) argued that creating search engines is costly, but as with 
much of the infrastructure of the Internet, the software to develop effective and scalable 
search engines is now free. The Apache Foundation, an organization that manages the 
development of the free Apache web server also distributes Nutch, an open source search 
engine, and Lucene, a free indexing mechanism. Yahoo! has also donated Hadoop, 
software designed to rapidly index large numbers of web pages.  
Although the software is free, adoption of new search engines depends on the utility they 
provide to users. This is usually based on the effectiveness of presenting the results of a 
search query. Ranking determines the order in which the most important search results 
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16	  Adam	  Raff,	  “Search,	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  You	  May	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  Find”,	  New	  York	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  Op-­‐Ed	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  “Yahoo!	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  Nov.	  5,	  2008,	  available	  at	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are displayed. The “Goto.com” search engine pioneered the “money talks” policy of paid 
search rankings and Google “AdWords” expanded that base with an auction-based 
scheme.  In many ways, the barriers presented by search engines and ad rankings are 
similar to Yellowpages. Businesses were at a disadvantage if they did not place paid 
advertisements in Yellowpages directories. One of the complexities that search 
companies face is that the variables governing advertisement (placement, frequency, 
relation to search, etc) are more complex than those used in static print media. Defining 
and communicating those characteristics, and having customers understand them is a 
complicated task. There is always a need for transparency so that advertisers understand 
what they are purchasing, particularly when competing “house brands” are also 
advertised, as Raff argued. This situation is similar to grocery stores that present their 
own house brand and a diverse array of competing brands whose placement is governed 
by a combination of consumer demand and “slotting-fees”; slotting fees have received 
much discussion (Aalberts 1999) as well as government scrutiny (FTC 2003) and 
enforcement actions at state and national levels (Gundlack 2005). It seems likely that 
anti-competitive behavior in search would encounter similar scrutiny, and the FTC has 
already asked companies to disclose paid search results. 
Despite the dominance of Google in the search-based advertising market, the search 
market itself has seen considerable innovation, in part because there are many corpora 
over which to search and many methods to rank or present results. Real-time search, 
personalized search, social search and peer-to-peer search tools are in active 
development. OneRiot.com is a start-up that recently partnered with Yahoo! to develop 
“real time” search (or search about breaking events rather than historical documents) and 
Lijit.com is a search engine focused on blogs and social networking. Ask.com and 
Aardvark focus on casting human questions into search queries. It may be that no search 
engine could compete with Google in the sense of becoming a multi-billion dollar 
company; many will be acquired by existing search companies. But it’s important to 
recognize that Google, as a company, is little more than ten years old. Given the low 
barriers to entry (other than customers), there should be continued innovation in search. 
It’s clear that search has become as important as naming in the Internet; it also influences 
the experience that users have because they have come to rely on the speed and accuracy 
of search to locate services. What’s not clear is if additional mechanisms beyond current 
laws are needed to insure a competitive and innovative Internet. 
Content Distribution & Cloud Computing - The Invisible Ecosystem 
The Internet has visible components, such as the browsers, rich application frameworks 
and search engines we’ve discussed. Equally important is the invisible infrastructure that 
defines how the web and web services are implemented. In this section, we describe 
services that dramatically lower the barriers for creating new web services. Just as open-
source tools such as Nutch, Lucene and Hadoop reduce the technical barrier for 
developing a new search engine or service, new business models and technology reduce 
the operational barriers to effectively deploying and scaling those services. 
Content distribution networks (CDNs), co-location and peering arrangements are some of 
the most critical elements of the Internet ecosystem that affect the web as it is used today. 
A CDN is an organized network of computers that are often placed “close” to Internet 
users. Commonly accessed content is then stored on those computers and requests by web 
users are directed to a “near by” or lightly loaded computers. Content distribution 
networks can be used to save bandwidth since the content for a popular item does not 
need to be fetched from a distant location; this was the basis for our original concern 
(Grunwald 2007) that solely focusing on the access network wouldn’t prevent 
performance discrimination. However, with the drop in price for Internet bandwidth, 
CDNs have primarily become useful because they provide a way to provide scalable 
service. The canonical example for this is the success that Victoria’s Secret (a retailer) 
had in hosting on-line content before and after using a commercial CDN. In the initial 
offering, demand for the retailers content exceeded the capabilities of their own web 
services but successive offerings using a CDN were much more successful18. 
The Web would present a very different experience without CDNs, but the use of a CDN 
provides as much opportunity to discriminate performance as subtle packet differentiation 
or “traffic shaping” on an access network.  Indeed, comments in (Scherlis 2010) indicate 
that ISPs in China market their own content networks and hosting services as providing 
better access to their own clients. In a competitive market place, the difference in 
performance is less a conspiracy than the result of innovative network architectures. 
Different combinations of CDNs and network management lead to differing degrees of 
efficiency (Jiang 2009) but efficient network architectures can still enable competition. 
At the same time CDNs enhance the ability of a web company or organization to 
successfully connect with readers without having to invest huge sums in capital 
infrastructure. 
In a Wall Street Journal article in 200819, Kumar and Rhoads argued that such “fast track” 
access violates net neutrality. The fact is that most commercial content on websites is 
distributed using CDNs and that there is significant competition in CDNs in the United 
States20. The proposed FCC rules don’t seem to address the importance of this part of the 
Internet ecosystem. This is arguably good, because no concrete harms have been shown – 
indeed, the existing “fast track” access has enabled more companies to scale to meet web 
demand. But this highlights the rather arbitrary nature of the proposed FCC rules.  The 
proposed rules would arguably also prohibit new services or offerings by “network 
operators” that could achieve the benefits of CDNs using different technical means, thus 
increasing competition in this segment of the Internet ecosystem. 
Peering relationships between different ISPs, application providers and Tier-1 network 
providers also enable “fast tracks” for information; (Yoo 2010) has a readable description 
of modern peering architectures. Most of those peering relationships have been 
historically “settlement free” because they benefit both parties and traffic demands were 
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  See	  Vishesh	  Kumar	  and	  Christopher	  Rhoads,	  “Google	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  Dan	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symmetrical. Increasingly, the line between “backbone”, application and edge network 
provider have blurred. Google and large CDN companies such as Limelight now run 
some of the largest Internet backbones (Labovitz 2009). At the same time, “edge” 
network companies such as Comcast, AT&T and Verizon also carry considerable 
corporate or “non-public” network traffic. Amid the consolidation in networking 
companies, “paid peering” has emerged as a way to enable content providers or other co-
location companies to reduce the cost of access while improving performance for their 
hosted partners21.  Content distribution networks (and peering) improve performance; 
being excluded from such interaction would raise costs or limit competition. Reaching a 
sizable population would be possible but would require significant investment to be 
“scalable”. 
The proposed FCC rules don’t clearly indicate whether peering and content distribution 
relationships constitute “neutral” access or in what situations they constitute 
“discriminatory” access. Again, this is arguably good, because there are few instances in 
which concrete harms have been demonstrated. In the past, the Internet has been 
“partitioned” because Internet providers could not agree on pricing for transit or peering 
relationships22 and more consumers have experienced network problems from to these 
business disputes than those affected by the rules in the proposed FCC regulations. Is 
regulation needed to cover peering? History indicates that existing dispute resolution 
mechanisms (lawsuits, agreements and contracts) can resolve these problems. This lends 
credence to the argument that those same mechanisms will insure competition in other 
Internet services such as CDNs. 
Just as CDNs developed out of a need to replicate and distribute “static” content, a new 
market, “Cloud Computing”, has emerged as a technology that subsumes CDNs and 
facilitates even faster changes in technology. Cloud computing providers such as Amazon 
EC2, Rackspace, AT&T, IBM, Microsoft and several others run warehouse-sized data 
centers on which customers can lease and run customized software. Combined with 
“virtualization technology”, which lets users capture the entire configuration of a 
computer in a form that can be shipped off to a remote data center, cloud computing has 
changed the economics of establishing Internet services.  Cloud computing systems can 
typically be leased by the hour and new online services can be launched quickly. For 
example, in early 2010, Amazon’s EC2 (a service that popularized the cloud computing 
model) rents individual “machines” for $0.02/hr to $2.40/hr depending on the machine 
resources23. More importantly, since the leasing is “per-hour” and because machines can 
be “turned on” quickly, software can be designed to use resources as needed. 
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  For	  example,	  in	  2008,	  Sprint	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Cloud computing has accelerated the deconstruction of monolithic software systems into 
components into a “service oriented architecture” that can be used as a service. Examples 
include Twilio.com, which integrates the legacy telephone network and provides voice-
guided phone services. Such services, coupled with the ability to rapid deploy systems 
using cloud computing, allow developers to innovate in a select part of the software 
systems. But all these components – CDNs, cloud computing, software as a service 
systems – are rapidly becoming integral to the way that applications and services are 
deployed on the Internet. How will they be affected by regulation? 
The	  Risks	  of	  Regulation	  In	  The	  Internet	  Ecosystem	  
There are several risks to the proposed network neutrality rules. These concerns include 
whether “neutral” networks even exist or are beneficial, the uncertainty concerning how 
services and applications should be treated, the risks of mandating monitoring for legal 
content and innovation in network management. We then address a general concern about 
the ability or wisdom of applying regulation in an era of fast-paced technology 
development by examining a particular Internet application regulated by the FCC. 
Insensible Neutrality 
Proponents of network neutrality legislation assume that people could agree on what a 
“neutral” network is and that any management other than existing prioritization methods 
will break applications. Is it possible for consumers to spot a “non-neutral” network? If 
neutrality cannot be measured or sensed, it’s difficult to know when it is being violated or 
if it is even important. In our earlier work (Grunwald 2007), we detailed how the lack of 
clearly stated service level agreements for residential service and the multi-party nature 
of the Internet make it difficult to know what is affecting performance and who is 
responsible. Studies by networking researchers in (Akella 2003) and also more recently 
in (Dischinger 2007) have shown through careful measurement that the major 
performance limitations (latency, bandwidth, jitter) faced by most broadband users occur 
because of the technologies used in “last mile” access network – the connection to an 
individual house. At the same time, a study conducted in 2009 of Internet users in the US 
and Europe (Maier 2009) showed that user’s home networks, and in particular the use of 
“WiFi” wireless networks, imposes more latency and variability than the access network 
itself. These measurement studies were conducted so broadly (across multiple ISP's in 
multiple countries) that they indicate that latency limitations and variability exist in most 
access networks. These limitations are caused by pressing existing infrastructure (cable 
and phone lines) into service for purposes they were never intended to serve, rather than 
by anti-competitive actions. 
Because the Internet is composed of many pieces made by different parties, it’s difficult 
to understand what causes specific problems. This is true even for experts – in a network 
measurement study, members of our research group initially reported  that many types of 
network sessions were being blocked; upon further analysis (and much embarrassment), 
we had to retract that report because the problems were caused by a home networking 
router24. This action only occurred when the home router was overloaded, but if the cause 
was not immediately clear to networking researchers, it’s unlikely that an average 
consumer could identify similar problems. 
As is clear by the success of existing applications, Internet protocol and application 
designers understand that minor fluctuations in latency and bandwidth go with the 
territory of the current Internet. Applications and various parts of the broader “Internet 
Architecture” are designed to accommodate those variations; there's good reason to 
believe that the design principles used in existing applications could overcome “subtle 
preferential treatment” just as they overcome the highly variable best-effort 
characteristics of the Internet. For example, video distribution systems came to rely on 
“faster than real time” downloads to successfully deliver video on the existing Internet 
(Odlyzko 2008). Despite the broad success of VOIP companies such as Vonage, Skype 
and the like, highly interactive applications (voice or video communication and 
interactive gaming) are usually thought to be sensitive to latency. However, comments 
submitted to the FCC by interactive game developers (Scherlis 2010) indicate that the 
current Internet is suitable for those applications.  
All of this indicates that improving the speed of Internet access rather than fixing current 
network designs into law better serves consumers. 
Fostering a Competitive Ecosystem 
The proposed FCC rules affect only one part of the network, but performance and the 
user experience are affected by many parts of the network. Both content distribution and 
cloud computing resources are distributed globally and interconnected by private IP 
networks; since these are not “public networks”, these facilities are free to prioritize 
traffic for payment without violating the proposed network neutrality rules. Singling out a 
single part of the Internet for regulation doesn’t seem to insure the goal of competitive 
networks that respond to consumer needs. 
There is continued vertical integration of the Internet market wherein “access network” 
providers also become CDNs or application companies (like Google) or retailers (like 
Amazon) become cloud computing providers. It’s unclear how proposed regulations that 
distinguish between “public” and “private” networks will apply as those network 
companies recombine and change form. This either requires greater clarity of when the 
proposed network neutrality rules apply or, better yet, a “wait and see attitude” with 
action taken when anti-competitive harms actually occur. 
Regulating Legal Content 
The proposed neutrality rules focus on lawful content, and there have been both calls and 
proposals for applying “deep packet inspection” to assist in enforcing intellectual 
property ownership25. These efforts pose considerable costs and significant risks, both of 
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  AT&T	  has	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  that	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  will	  filter	  Internet	  content	  for	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misidentifying legal content as illegal and of failing to identify illegal content. 
Researchers have shown that anyone (including inanimate objects) can be implicated in 
file sharing (Piatek 2008). Existing file sharing systems are far from “stealthy” and are 
easy to monitor. Illegal file sharing is already hidden using “anonymity overlays” 
(McCoy 2008) and simple protocol extensions make it much more difficult to decidedly 
identify illegal file sharing activity (Bauer 2008).  
At the same time, the rapid commoditization of co-location services, cloud computing 
and content distribution networks are also affecting illegal content. Not only can new 
companies be launched quickly, less legal Internet services are also possible. One of the 
many reasons that “peer-to-peer” (P2P) applications are popular is because they allow 
people to use their own infrastructure for file sharing. With the emergence of inexpensive 
cloud computing and other leased computing services, there has been a surge in the 
amount of Internet traffic for “hosted file services” at the expense of P2P services26, 
making it easier for file-sharing to use those high performance systems rather than rely on 
the low-bandwidth uplinks common to the asymmetric network architectures used for 
access.  
The rapid change in infrastructure that drives much of the Internet ecosystem illustrates 
the challenge to monitoring unlawful content. In two short years, “bandwidth intensive” 
applications such as video and file sharing have moved to systems using the same 
protocols and service providers as “legitimate” services. Because those systems use 
encryption, any mandated monitoring of such traffic will be both expensive and error 
prone. Stopping illegal content by monitoring traffic requires that all traffic be monitored 
and the costs to implement this will be borne by all users of the Internet. Pushing this 
requirement on all network providers imposes a significant cost to benefit a different 
industry. 
Curtailing Innovation in Network Management 
The propose neutrality rules distinguish between “managed” and “public” services, but 
the discussion about what constitutes managed services are relatively ad hoc and clearly 
capture the status quo rather than what is possible. An existing example would be having 
distinct network service for latency-sensitive traffic, such as voice. Some existing 
“competition friendly” networks (Moerman 2005) use a managed network exclusively for 
one of many possible voice services and relegate “best effort” and streaming video 
services to other networks all carried on the same fiber; similar capabilities are present to 
varying degrees in almost all other access networks. Commercial Ethernet uses 802.1Q 
(VLAN) and 802.1P (CoS) to provide such managed networks. New home network 
technologies such as Multimedia Over Coax Alliance (MOCA) and HomePlug27 are 
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  See	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  HomePlug	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  the	  Multimedia	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  Alliance	  (http://www.mocalliance.org/)	  
rapidly being developed that allow different managed streams to be carried over the same 
physical cable.  
What have been missing are standards to link the differing streams in access network 
media to similar capabilities in home networks. A generalized capability to have multiple 
streams of data for multiple classes of service simplifies the distinction between 
“managed” and the “public” Internet and would allow additional managed services (e.g. 
video-conferencing could extend current “triple play” networks) or service offerings that 
let consumers choose between multiple service qualities. Some of these mechanisms are 
being developed28, but such innovation will be likely be halted if ambiguous regulation is 
in place. 
Similarly, many existing access network technologies have impediments that limit 
performance; even seemingly high performance networks such as DOCSIS cable 
modems benefit from “management” mechanisms29 to overcome such impediments 
(Martin 2005). Similarly, the existing congestion control algorithms used to balance the 
performance of one “flow” vs. another at all scales of the Internet is being re-examined 
by the technical community. Bauer, Clark & Lehr (Bauer 2009c) published a very 
readable history of congestion control. Internet connections “self-regulate” the bandwidth 
they use – without such self-regulation, TCP connections would only be limited by the 
ability of the sender. Those algorithms seek to balance congestion in the network with the 
ability of the receiver to accept packets. The original algorithms sought to allocate each 
“flow” a fair share of bandwidth. That decision is one reason why Peer-2-Peer 
applications exert more pressure on networks than e.g. simple host based streaming – p2p 
applications use many connections to download content, and each is striving for a “fair 
share” of the access network. There are on-going efforts to evolve network congestion 
control algorithms to include information from the network in an order to build a more 
responsive and efficient network; network neutrality legislation seemingly precludes such 
efforts. These efforts include both the access network and congestion control at routers in 
the “core” of the Internet. 
Technology On Internet Time 
The FCC orders affecting the AOL Instant Messaging system during the Time Warner & 
AOL merge provide a historical lesson about the risks and challenges of predicting the 
path of technology and the impact that regulation has on that path. Instant Messaging 
emerged in the mid-1990’s as a popular communication system based on a long history of 
“computer chat” systems in place since the early ‘70s. Messaging or “talk” applications 
were initially used on local area networks where the communication latency was 
sufficiently low. Because “chat” programs allowed users to communicate over long 
                                                28	  For	  example,	  PacketCable	  uses	  “Reserved	  Services	  Domain”	  to	  handle	  managed	  services;	  standards	  are	  being	  developed	  to	  bridge	  that	  standard	  with	  the	  MOCA	  home	  networking	  standard	  to	  preserve	  different	  service	  classes.	  
29	  DOCSIS	  cable	  modem	  networks	  tend	  to	  have	  “bursty”	  uplink	  connections,	  and	  this	  causes	  TCP/IP	  throughput	  to	  be	  lower	  than	  what	  the	  downlink	  can	  support.	  This	  particular	  study	  examines	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  “TCP	  ACK	  compression”	  to	  see	  if	  it	  overcomes	  the	  problems	  in	  the	  physical	  access	  network.	  This	  mechanism	  monitors	  TCP/IP	  connection	  characteristics	  and	  delays	  specific	  uplink	  traffic	  at	  the	  cable	  modem	  to	  eliminate	  redundant	  acknowledgement	  messages.	  The	  basic	  mechanism	  has	  been	  studied	  in	  other	  domains,	  but	  is	  rarely	  applied.	  
distances in near-real-time, they became increasingly popular on systems run by 
companies such as CompuServe, Prodigy, AOL and others. As with much of the on-line 
content of those systems, chat systems were initially “walled gardens” that only served 
the members of those services. As the commercial Internet evolved and became popular 
in the mid-to-late ‘90’s, there was a greater interest in having IM systems operate across 
multiple services. 
Instant messaging is notable because it is one of the few Internet technologies to have 
been affected by FCC and FTC orders. This occurred during the merger between AOL 
and Time-Warner; Faulhaber (Faulhaber 2002) has an excellent analysis and history of 
the reasoning behind orders affecting AOL Instant Messaging (AIM). At the time, 
Lehman Brothers valued AIM as $5.8B during the merger in 2000. AIM had 130 million 
members or users30 and appeared to have considerable market dominance over nascent 
IM alternatives such as Microsoft MSN Messenger.  
Prior to the merger, AOL and Microsoft had engaged in the “IM wars” wherein AOL 
exploited a security flaw in the AIM software to block inter-operation with competing 
services, such as Messenger. Microsoft, and other IM companies, lobbied for open access 
to the AIM service as condition of merger. Faulhaber argues that this was one of the first 
times that network effects was used as an argument in regulatory oversight in the absence 
of specific harm. It was thought that if Time Warner were able to block other IM systems 
from access to their cable modem networks, AIM would have significant advantage. This 
was thought important because it was clear that as network speeds increased, IM systems 
would evolve into a series of services (video chat, file transfer) that would expand on the 
value of the existing systems. The “names and presence directory” (NPD) was seen as 
being a critical infrastructure for IM services that precluded interoperability with other 
services. AOL resisted efforts to publish clear protocol standards or allow interoperation 
between their NPD and other software, asserting concerns of “security” and “privacy” for 
its users31.  
The FCC conditions for the AOL and Time-Warner merger prohibited the use of new 
“advanced” videoconference extensions unless standardized server-to-server 
interoperability mechanisms were implemented. Today, AIM is one of many protocols; 
although AOL still has the largest number of users, IM has both diminished in 
importance and multiple competing protocols and systems emerged. Today, it would be 
fanciful to image that AIM adds $5.8B of value for AOL. What happened? 
In a large part, the efforts of AOL to block use of their services spurred development of 
competing services – this was even apparent at the time the merger conditions were being 
debated32. In addition to the MSN Messenger system, several “open source” efforts were 
                                                30	  	  See	  Louise	  Rosen,	  Why	  IM	  matters	  so	  much,	  UPSIDE,	  September	  19,	  2000.	  The	  original	  reference	  is	  difficult	  to	  find,	  but	  is	  included	  in	  an	  Ex	  Parte	  filing	  by	  Gerad	  Waldron	  (Covington	  &	  Burling	  law	  firm)	  to	  Michael	  Powell,	  re:	  “Applictions	  of	  America	  Online	  and	  Time	  Warner	  Inc.,	  For	  Transfers	  of	  Control	  (CS	  Docket	  No.	  00-­‐30)”	  
31	  It	  was	  noted	  at	  the	  time	  that	  AOL’s	  concern	  about	  security	  and	  privacy	  was	  disingenuous	  given	  AOL’s	  reliance	  on	  a	  “buffer	  overflow”	  attack	  to	  block	  competing	  services;	  that	  same	  attack	  could	  be	  used	  to	  compromise	  the	  customer’s	  computer.	  
32	  See	  Jim Hu, AOL’s Lead in Instant Messaging Arena Dwindles, CNET NEWS.COM, Nov. 16, 2000 available at 
http://www.zdnetasia.com/news/communications/0,39044192,13030364,00.htm; this was referenced in footnote 
developed to produce scalable messaging platforms with the most successful being 
Jabber, which produced the XMPP33 protocol. These multiple implementations allowed 
companies to launch their own, private and customized IM services because the cost of 
deploying the technology was greatly reduced. People learned that adopting a new IM 
system wasn’t hard. In part, the plurality of systems and the willing to adopt new IM 
systems accelerated the use of IM and messaging systems for business applications. One 
of the complications of using AIM for business purposes was that AIM was often blamed 
for security lapses and that businesses had poor controls over the identity, security, 
privacy and logging needed when applying AIM to business applications. In particular, 
the various financial scandals that precipitated the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and other 
reporting and disclosure rules make it more important to keep accurate records and logs 
of communication between investors and financial advisors as well as between people in 
the investment community. This led several companies to stop using public IM 
networks34 in favor of “in house” networks. Eventually, those IM systems used web 
browsers rather than require extra clients to be downloaded. The development of “Web 
2.0” technologies such as AJAX changed the IM experience afforded by a browser 
interface to be equal to that of dedicated software. This allowed businesses to maintain 
control over “customer chat” and tie the system with customer names or account 
numbers. 
The pace of technology adoption and the peculiar needs of companies seeking to employ 
IM systems means that although AOL’s system is still the largest IM system, there was 
no strangle hold on innovation or capabilities. The pace of this innovation was addressed 
in the FCC merger memorandum:  
“Finally, it might be thought that in the rapidly changing technology of the 
Internet, even network effects and AOL’s present position in the market 
would not prevent successful entry by IM providers other than AOL, that a 
new breakthrough technology might become available and would be 
superior enough to AOL’s service to overcome the network effects 
flowing from its NPD, and cause users to shift en masse away from AOL. 
…..We see no evidence at this time, however, of such a new breakthrough 
technology strong enough to overtake AOL’s NPD.” 
With the benefit of hindsight, we see that within 2-4 years after the merger orders were 
written, events led to rich IM competition. Customers did not shift en masse away from 
AOL because they didn’t need to – they simply used other technologies in concert with 
AIM. 
Hindsight certainly helps in seeing trends, but some trends are only apparent when other 
technologies arise. One of the FCC’s concerns with the AOL and Time-Warner merger 
                                                
435 of the FCC memorandum.	  
33	  Extensible	  Messaging	  and	  Presence	  Protocol;	  see	  http://xmpp.org	  for	  more	  information.	  
34	  	  See	  for	  example	  Thomas	  Hoffman,	  	  “Sarbanes-Oxley trumps IM at some firms Concerns about security, 
archiving prompt companies to unplug instant messaging systems”,	  Computer	  World,	  August	  8th,	  2005.	  Available	  as	  http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/103752/Sarbanes_Oxley_trumps_IM_at_some_firms	  
was that it might lead to a new dominant signaling and communication system by the 
introduction of new services over AIM. We’ve argued that this didn’t come to pass 
because alternate services became available (and were easy to adopt), that mechanisms 
existed to work around restrictions and that open standards reduced the barrier for entry. 
The rapid evolution of technology was in contrast to most of the history of 
telecommunications and this rapid evolution made it difficult to estimate the impact of 
regulation. 
Maintaining	  a	  Vibrant	  Internet	  Ecosystem	  
 
Technology on the Internet moves both slower and quicker than most technology 
overseen by traditional regulation. VOIP technologies were in place almost a decade 
before they became widely adopted. Promising technologies such as AIM arose, peaked 
and then diminished in value dramatically within that same period of time. The 
technology for one application was largely a substitute for the other35 but that wasn’t 
clear at the time. 
There are approaches other than or in addition to regulation that would help maintain a 
vibrant Internet. These include: having clear standards and methods for measuring what 
is actually happening in the Internet as well as methods for reporting or disseminating 
policy to consumers; use existing agencies and policies; encourage innovation and 
competition for access networks; and, developing “best practices” that can be clearly 
understood by network operators, regulators and consumers. 
Measure and Report 
Clearly identifying problems in the Internet and apportioning blame is very difficult. 
Consumers on access networks typically want answers to three questions: can I access a 
specific service; is the latency or quality of that service acceptable; and, is there a 
bandwidth problem for a specific service. 
Consumers often jump to conclusions when a service or site is blocked or unavailable. 
Services may be blocked by an ISP – or, the service may actually be down. Alternatively, 
parts of the Internet protocols not under control of the ISP (such as DNS) may misdirect 
traffic. In extreme cases, events half way around the world may block services36.  
                                                35	  The	  XMPP	  protocol	  used	  by	  Jabber	  and	  Google	  Talk	  has	  been	  extended	  as	  “Jingle”	  by	  Google	  to	  enable	  voice	  calls.	  Similarly,	  voice	  systems	  such	  as	  Skype	  added	  support	  for	  basic	  and	  “enhanced”	  IM	  services.	  
36	  One	  example	  occurred	  in	  February	  2008	  when	  the	  government	  of	  Pakistan	  ordered	  access	  to	  YouTube	  to	  be	  blocked	  within	  Pakistan.	  The	  network	  operators	  for	  Pakistan	  Telecom	  implemented	  that	  order	  by	  issuing	  a	  “black	  hole	  route”.	  This	  is	  a	  method	  whereby	  a	  network	  router	  advertizes	  that	  it	  has	  an	  efficient	  route	  to	  the	  designated	  host	  but	  then	  actually	  discards	  that	  traffic.	  That	  “black	  hole	  route”	  was	  then	  published	  to	  other	  ISPs,	  causing	  a	  large	  part	  of	  the	  world	  to	  think	  that	  Pakistan	  had	  a	  very	  good	  connection	  to	  YouTube;	  this	  caused	  broad	  outages	  for	  YouTube.	  See	  http://asert.arbornetworks.com/2008/02/internet-­‐routing-­‐insecuritypakistan-­‐nukes-­‐youtube/	  for	  more	  details.	  
The debate concerning network neutrality has prompted the development of several 
measurement tools to determine if application blocking or data modification is occurring. 
Examples include the “Switzerland” tool (developed by the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation37), the “Glasnost” tool developed by The Max Planck Institute (Dischinger 
2010) and the “Measurement Lab” consortium that supports both education and analysis 
tools38. These tools either detect specific problems (e.g. BitTorrent blocking) or identify 
factors that may delay communication. They are first steps in helping consumers identify 
what may be wrong and to assist in network monitoring. However, they are still primitive 
and require considerable sophistication to deploy and interpret.  
It would be better for ISPs to be transparent about their network management policies and 
network conditions. Many ISPs block services that appear to arise from “malware”; 
sometimes those services are actual but uncommon services. For example, (Scherlis 
2010) notes that game developers often need to contact ISPs to remove blocked services 
that are mis-identified as malware. As the same time, consumers are typically unaware 
when one of their home computers or devices is launching network attacks on others. 
What’s missing is a mechanism or protocol for communicating current management and 
policy information to consumers. Developing standards or protocols for informing 
customers about “suspicious” traffic would remove much of the confusion when an 
application stops working. There are existing protocols (such as SNMP and RMON) 
designed to communicate network performance, but these protocols are designed for 
network management rather than consumer enlightenment – they provide too much detail 
for consumers and provide no insight into what steps can be taken to correct problems. 
Through efforts such as the P4P consortium39, ISPs have found that it’s possible to work 
with applications to reduce bandwidth demands and costs. Similar tools for 
communicating with consumers would likely improve customer service and help reduce 
network security problems. Efforts to inform consumers about broadband capabilities 
would allow broadband providers to compete based on those different services without 
consumers complaining about hidden differences. The British regulator, Ofcom, has 
established a voluntary “Code of Conduct” for ISPs that communicates much of this 
information to consumers prior to sale and during service40. 
Maintain Competitive Applications, Content and Services 
Content distribution and cloud computing services dramatically reduce the infrastructure 
cost for computing and web applications, allowing non-commercial groups to rapidly 
scale their efforts. Software innovations and business models that can exploit these new 
                                                37	  See	  the	  EFF	  website,	  “Swizterland	  Network	  Testing	  Tool”,	  available	  at	  http://www.eff.org/testyourisp/switzerland	  
38	  Measurement	  labs	  (http://www.measurementlab.net/)	  arose	  from	  an	  effort	  by	  a	  number	  of	  companies,	  university	  faculty	  and	  Internet	  researchers	  to	  determine	  technical	  approaches	  to	  measuring	  the	  network	  access	  characteristics.	  
39	  P4P	  is	  a	  reporting	  method	  that	  allows	  P2P	  software	  to	  learn	  the	  “topology”	  of	  ISPs,	  allowing	  the	  P2P	  software	  to	  avoid	  expensive	  or	  congested	  links.	  More	  information	  is	  available	  at	  http://www.openp4p.net/	  
40	  The	  Code	  for	  Contact	  is	  available	  at	  http://www.ofcom.org.uk/telecoms/ioi/copbb/copbb/	  
platforms are enabling even more rapid innovation. Vertical integration in these markets 
may or may not lead to anti-competitive behavior; however, these technologies are so 
new that it’s not clear whether they will remain in their current form or if concerns about 
fair competition will last longer than the technology itself. Rather than enacting 
preemptive and broad rules to regulate these hybrid “private/public” networks, waiting 
for harms to emerge, coupled with the possibility of anti-trust laws and enforcement from 
the FTC and the Department of Justice, will foster more innovation. 
Predicting the future of technology is difficult as suggested by the analysis of the likely 
outcome of the competition surrounding AOL Instant Messaging. That regulation was 
eclipsed by the reality of rapid technology development, external technology, and 
changes in business practice and usage patterns. Although there is certain to be 
consolidation in the “cloud computing” ecosystem, it’s remains to be seen if the 
consolidation will foster anti-competitive behaviors. 
Maintain Competitive Networks With Transparency & Clarity 
Business networks (primarily Ethernet) have many mechanisms to improve flexibility, 
control performance or diagnose problems. Consumer access network technology is only 
beginning to see similar development and there is a real risk that regulation will curtail 
investment or development of those technologies.  At the same time, certain services 
benefit from separation from general best effort traffic – this is why many businesses use 
different “virtual private networks” to separate different kinds of traffic. As home users 
expand the range of services they use, consumers may be better served by technologies 
that enable multiple network services, each with different qualities. 
Likewise, innovations in congestion control will continue and can be implemented in 
many parts of the networks. Researchers are exploring the tension between enforcing 
congestion control at the end-pointers (where it may take years to upgrade or replace all 
the software) vs. upgrading specific routers or other parts of the network. Precluding 
implementation at the access network will simply increase the costs of network 
management. Rather than exclude specific mechanisms such as congestion control, 
regulation should be used to foster goals such as competition. 
Keep Ahead of the Technology 
The Internet is complex, encompassing both traditional communication services as well 
as computer systems, novel services and rapidly evolving technology. Developing an on-
going process for discussing and analyzing the interplay between the different 
technologies is critical. There are specific actions that can foster more thoughtful review. 
One would be to have an organization that provides independent and informed council to 
policy makers about the Internet ecosystem as a whole; this is a difficult charge because 
some emerging trends aren’t apparent until they are established businesses. The other 
action is to counter specific concerns that have been indicated by prior regulators and 
develop standards or tools to mitigate those concerns.  
There are many bodies that examine and discuss how Internet technology should be 
developed; other groups discuss business practices and yet others research new 
techniques or services. It’s equally important to have a continued and informed 
discussion of how technology, business and new services affect future policy so that 
policy makers can stay ahead of the technology. It’s useful to guide technology before it 
is widely deployed because that lessens the cost of regulation. 
One such example is the “network effects” of systems such as instant messaging systems, 
or the “stickiness” of specific Email addresses. As an example, although there have been 
petitions for “email portability”, there has been little serious study of the concept. 
However, “identity” on the Internet is one of the key features that makes “network 
effects” important. Although AIM wasn’t the only messaging tool available, moving to 
another system entailed rediscovering the identity of your friends. Looking into the 
present where Instant Messaging has been replaced with Social Networking, the same 
issues that were raised about AIM “stickiness” may be raised about Facebook or 
MySpace. Here, the technical community is moving faster than the regularity world -- 
there have long been Internet standards (e.g. DNS) that allow “machine portability” and 
there are developing standards, such as OpenID, for “people portability”. Such identity 
systems could have significant impact when widely adopted, but it’s also important to 
understand and clarify how such systems will interact with regulation. 
Regulation	  should	  be	  a	  process,	  not	  a	  product	  	  
We’ve argued that regulation or legislation that simply affects control of the access work 
policies while ignoring the impact of the rest of the Internet ecosystem is a disservice to 
consumers. At the same time, regulation or legislation that affects the entire Internet is 
over-reaching and also not needed. 
To date, most of the network neutrality discussion has been heavily influenced by 
existing telecommunications regulation – this is natural since most regulation seeks to 
model new systems after old. This has led regulators to focus on “bits in flight” – e.g. the 
regulation of access networks – while largely ignoring the “bits at rest” (content 
distribution networks) that make up much of the Internet. That distinction between basic 
and information services is rapidly being challenged by the development of an integrated 
Internet ecosystem. Focusing on “bits in flight” also impacts the ability of regulators (or 
even tech pundits) to predict the evolution of services. We highlighted the example of 
AOL Instant Messenger in this paper, arguing the comparison between AIM and the 
existing communications systems missed the rapidity with which new and competing 
systems could be deployed using the existing infrastructure. Standardization and open 
software and protocols also meant that the cost of developing a new system was radically 
reduced compared to existing telecommunications systems. The rapid evolution of the 
Internet makes it difficult to insure that regulation is still meaningful by the time it is 
developed.  
True network neutrality is about competition and innovation and any such discussion 
must involve the full Internet ecosystem. It’s clear that narrowly defined rules affecting 
one part of that ecosystem are not the best solution to maintaining a competitive and 
responsive Internet. Existing legislation (primarily anti-trust laws in the case of browsers 
and the threat of similar laws in advertising based search) are being applied and should be 
able to address future anti-competitive actions. At the same time, consumers would 
benefit from competition, innovation and better information about the services available 
to them. 
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